|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
IRAN VS ISRAEL |
 |
SCHOKKENDE BRIEF ACHMADINEJAD AAN ANGELA MERKEL
|
News Headlines in Mon 28 August 2006
Full text letter of Islamic Republic Of IRAN president to German chancellor
Ahmadinejad: Iran not after acquiring nuclear weapons
Full text letter of Islamic Republic Of IRAN president to German chancellor
In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Her Excellency Angela Merkel
The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Excellency,
Please accept my warmest greetings.
If it had it not been for Germany being a great contributor to progress in science, philosophy, literature, arts and politics;
If it had not been for a more important and positive influence of Germany in international relations and promotion of peace;
Moreover, if it had not been for the persistence of a strong will by certain global powers and special groups to constantly portray Germany as defeated and indebted country of World War II in order to continue their extortions;
And if it had not been for the presence of Your Excellency at the top of the executive branch of your country as an experienced stateswoman with bitter and sweet experiences in two dissimilar societies with different political systems and traditions,
And at the same time, if it had not been for the advantages that are limited to women, such as stronger human sentiments and certain manifestations of the divine compassion and kindness, specially in the position of a mother and being at the service of the people, and the common responsibility of all people with faith in God to defend human dignity and worth and to prevent violations of their rights and their humiliation, and proceeding from this conviction that we are all created by the Almighty and He has bestowed upon us all dignity and no one has any special privileges over the other, and under no circumstances could a society be deprived of its rights, barred from pursuit of progress and perfection or be controlled or humiliated;
Finally, if it had not been for the oppression, however different, of our nations, our shared responsibility to promote justice as the most basic foundation for promotion of peace and human equality, I would not have found the motive to write this letter.
Honourable Chancellor
Rulers come and go, but people with culture and history and their attachments and desires will keep on staying. Opportunities in front of those in position of high power are transient, even if they may be vast and broad. These opportunities are very auspicious and can play a key role in the negative and positive transformations and developments of a nation.
Those in position of high power do not normally have many opportunities, but are accountable before the Almighty and people due to their high responsibility. We know this, and you know it as well.
Some of these developments can have regional, continental and global ramifications and can hardly be overlooked.
For sometime I have been thinking why some nations that their history shows they have indeed had an important and prominent share and role in material and spiritual progress of mankind in various arenas of science, arts, philosophy, literature and politics and were makers of civilization are not allowed to be proud as a nation of their historical accomplishments and play their deserved and constructive role on the global arena. They try to keep the black cloud of humiliation and shame hanging over their heads. And even more regrettably, some of the leaders of such a nation regard this situation befitting them and their nation and try to justify it. This is really an astonishing phenomenon in today’s world. The propaganda machinery after World War II has been so colossal that has caused some people to believe that they are the guilty party by historical accounts and must pay the penalty fort the wrongs committed by their forefathers for successive generations and for indefinite period of time.
Excellency
World War II came to an end with all its material and moral losses and its 60 million casualties. The death of human beings is tragic and sad. In all divine religions and before all awakened conscience and pure nature of mankind and the sense of right and wrong, the life, property and honour of people, regardless of their religious persuasion and ethnic background, must be respected at all times and all places.
Sixty years have passed since the end of the war. But, regrettably the entire world and some nations in particular are still facing its consequences. Even now the conduct of some bullying powers and power-seeking and aggressive groups is the conduct of victors with the vanquished.
The extortion and blackmail continue, and people are not allowed to think about or even question the source of this extortion, otherwise they face imprisonment. When will this situation end? Sixty years, one hundred years or one thousand years, when? I am sorry to remind you that today the perpetual claimants against the great people of Germany are the bullying powers and the Zionists that founded the Al-Qods Occupying Regime with the force of bayonets in the Middle East.
The Honourable Chancellor
I have no intention of arguing about the Holocaust. But, does it not stand to reason that some victorious countries of World War II intended to create an alibi on the basis of which they could continue keeping the defeated nations of World War II indebted to them. Their purpose has been to weaken their morale and their inspiration in order to obstruct their progress and power. In addition to the people of Germany, the peoples of the Middle East have also borne the brunt of the Holocaust. By raising the necessity of settling the survivors of the Holocaust in the land of Palestine, they have created a permanent threat in the Middle East in order to rob the people of the region of the opportunities to achieve progress. The collective conscience of the world is indignant over the daily atrocities by the Zionist occupiers, destruction of homes and farms, killing of children, assassinations and bombardments.
Excellency, you have seen that the Zionist government does not even tolerate a government elected by the Palestinian people, and over and over again has demonstrated that it recognizes no limit in attacking the neighbouring countries.
The question is why did the victors of the war, especially England that had apparently such a strong sense of responsibility toward the survivors of the Holocaust not allow them to settle in their territory. Why did they force them to migrate to other people’s land by launching a wave of anti-Semitism? Using the excuse for the settlement of the survivors of the Holocaust, they encouraged the Jews worldwide to migrate and today a large part of the inhabitants of the occupied territories are non-European Jews. If tyranny and killing is condemned in one part of the world, can we acquiesce and go along with tyranny, killing, occupation and assassinations in another part of the world simply in order to redress the past wrongs?
Excellency
We need to ask ourselves that for what purposes the millions of dollars that the Zionists receive from the treasury of some Western countries are spent for. Are they used for the promotion of peace and the well-being of the people? Or are they used for waging war against Palestinians and the neighbouring countries. Are the nuclear arsenals of Israel intended to be used in defense of the survivors of the Holocaust or as a permanent thereat against nations of the region and as an instrument of coercion, and possibly to defend the interests of certain circles of power in the Western countries.
Regrettably, the influence of the Zionists in the economy, media and some centers of political power has endangered interests of the European nations and has robbed them of many opportunities. The main alibi for this approach is the extortion they exact from the Holocaust.
One can imagine what standing some European countries could have had and what global role they could have played, if it had not been for this sixty-year old imposition.
I believe we both share the view that the flourishing of nations and their role are directly related to freedom and sense of pride.
Fortunately, with all the pressures and limitations, the great nation of Germany has been able to take great strides toward advancement and has become a major economic powerhouse in Europe that also seeks to play a more effective role in international interactions. But just imagine where Germany would be today in terms of its eminence among the freedom-loving nations, Muslims of the world and peoples of Europe, if such a situation did not exist and the governments in power in Germany had said no to the extortions by the Zionists and had not supported the greatest enemy of mankind.
It is sad to admit that Europe has lost a lot of its clout in global interactions and has not been able to face and overcome major challenges by relying on itself. This is, of course, understandable. The big powers outside of the continent intend to prove that Europe cannot rely on itself and do anything without their help and intervention.
Our people have also suffered from the interventions by some of the victors of the war after World War II. For many years they interfered in our internal affairs and did not want to see our nation conquer the pinnacles of progress and perfection. They had their eyes on our natural wealth, above all on our energy resources. To secure their own interests, they overthrew the legally constituted government of the time, installed a dictatorial regime and supported it to the end. Later, they supported Saddam in the war imposed on our people and observed no humanitarian boundary in their support for the Iraqi dictator. Our nation has experienced the pain and anguish from the interferences of those who are now crying out for human rights. There are still many suffering from the wounds and injuries of this war.
Many of these aggressions have taken place by those who regard themselves the victors of the World War II. They allow themselves to do whatever they wish, and unfortunately, after the end of the Cold War, the arrogance and expansionist ambitions of these powers have escalated.
We believe that still a major part of the peoples of the world and even international organizations are under the influence of the behaviour and the conduct of the victors of the World War II.
I explained the position of the people and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the United Nations General Assembly. Is the present state of affairs such as the rules governing the work of the Security Council, especially the right to veto, fair?
Do you not think that the time has come to change these rules in cooperation with independent governments? These rules are by no means acceptable to the collective conscience of nations and are contrary to the sense of reason and human nature. At least, if we want to be fairer, some other countries of the world should be allowed to benefit from the right to veto.
Madam Chancellor
You are familiar with the pains and sufferings currently afflicting our world. Today, the pain and suffering of the people of Iraq that come from occupation, absence of security and daily acts of terrorism are tormenting the entire humanity. Relentless interferences of some bullying powers in the internal affairs of other nations, antagonism toward the inalienable rights of nations to have access to more advanced technologies, subjecting nations to permanent threats by relying on arsenals of chemical and nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, opposition to popular governments in Latin America, supporting coup d’état and dictatorial regimes, absence of due attention to Africa and taking advantage of the power vacuum there to plunder their wealth are among the problems facing our world today. In my letter to President Bush, I spelled out a long list of contemporary global problems.
Where are the roots of these problems? How long can they continue? Do you not think that the main root lies in the fact that some of the rulers and powers of today have distanced themselves from the teachings of the divine prophets, the teachings of Abraham, Moses and Jesus Christ (peace be upon him) and the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him).
These teachings are in all divine religions that you and I believe:
· God is the creator of all things and beings. We have all been created free and He has not allowed us to be the servant of anyone other than Him.
· He has commanded us to worship Him and to avoid all oppressors and tyrants.
· He has commanded us to be virtuous, to be good to and serve the people, and has directed us to be kind to and defend the oppressed and fight the oppressors.
· God has given humans dignity and scorns their humiliation.
· He has sent his messengers with clear reasons, the Book and a balance and has called on his servants to promote justice.
Based on these shared principles and foundations of our faith, we believe:
· Peace and tranquility can only be established and endure on the basis of faith in God and justice.
· Peace and dignity are the rights of all nations.
· Pursuit of progress and better livelihood combined with spirituality, compassion and well-being is the right of people.
· You and we can found a new movement to achieve these noble human ideals by relying on these principles and the articles of faith that are common to all divine religions.
Our nations believe and are committed to these pillars of faith. The history has shown that the people of Iran are not familiar with aggressing and brutalizing other nations. Nevertheless, we do not allow being the subject and victim of aggression and brutality. The experience of the eight-year war clearly demonstrated this fact to the whole world.
I believe we and you have both been the subject of tyranny. They do not respect your rights and want us also to forego our rights. Fortunately, I have heard that you also speak your mind openly and are against engendering tension and wars.
Honourable Chancellor,
The inner instincts and nature of the peoples of the world have wakened up.
Tendency toward faith in the oneness of God is on the rise.
People will no longer tolerate to be tyrannized, humiliated and their rights violated.
The prevailing circumstances today differ from those of yesterday. Multiple standards and approaches in relations will not endure.
Iran and Germany can play a more important role together in the international arena by relying on the noble and high values.
This cooperative relationship can also enhance the role of Europe on the global scene and serve as a model of cooperation between two governments and nations.
Without doubt, cooperation of two peace-loving, powerful and cultured nations of Germany and Iran will serve the interests of Europe as well. Together we must end the present abnormalities in international relations, the type of order and relations that are based on the impositions of the victors of the World War II on the defeated nations. Nations and many governments will be on our side on this path.
We must make the shadow of World War II disappear and help the international community to promote security, freedom and sense of tranquility.
The people of Iran and Germany are two great nations that have contributed to the making of our civilization. They have rich culture and have been in the forefront of science, literature, arts and philosophy. Both of our people have a strong faith in God and follow the teachings of divine prophets. They have also had long-lasting scientific, cultural and commercial relations and share many valuable mutual interests.
I have no doubt that with the cooperation of the two governments and the support of the two great nations we can take great strides forward in alleviating the problems and abnormalities of our world today.
Daring and courageous decisions are the key to our success in overcoming the existing problems, countering the violations of rights and defending the rights of nations.
To the extent that I know of the people of Germany, they will come along and join us and want restore their dignity and influence for the sake of global peace and calm. Our people have the similar spirit.
Together we will be able to prove to some powers that respecting other nations and their rights is good for them as well. Our two nations and governments, next to each other, will be able to play a fundamental role in promoting peace, security, progress, and human dignity at the scale of two countries and internationally.
In closing, I pray to the Almighty for the success of Your Excellency and the government and people of Germany.
|
Irans nucleaire ambities
|
|
Israel 1-7-2008 Yochanan Visser |
Om de Israelische obsessie met de nucleaire aspiraties van Iran te begrijpen is het belangrijk verder te kijken dan alleen het Iraanse nucleaire programma en de uitspraken van Achmadinejad over het van de kaart vegen van Israel.
Daarom eerst een kleine introductie, in 1979 vond in de wereld een gebeurtenis plaats die verregaande konsekwenties zou hebben, de Iraanse islamitische revolutie, ik herinner me nog goed hoe ook de nederlandse media deze revolutie als een positieve wending neerzetten, in de trant van de bad guys tegen de good guys waarbij ayatollah Khomeiny de "good guy" was,vermoedelijk besefte toen niemand dat de revolutie die Khomeiny leidde een mondiaal doel had, in het westen werd het in ieder geval benaderd als een interne Iraanse kwestie.
Nu bijna 30 jaar later is het duidelijk wat de Iraanse islamitische revolutie werkelijk inhield, de Iraanse president doet er ook niet langer geheimzinnig over ,het doel is een Islamitische wereldrevolutie.
Om dit doel te bereiken streeft Iran er naar een zogenaamde "superpower" te worden, op termijn in plaats van de USA., dankzij haar enorme rijkdom aan olie en gas is Iran in staat om deze aspiraties te verwezelijken en heeft een immens wapenprogramma lopen ,waarbij het op dit moment al over lange afstand ballistische raketten beschikt, chemische wapens, eigen ontwerp gevechtsvliegtuigen en ........een nucleair programma.
De Islamitische revolutie heeft ook een ingrijpend andere situatie in het Midden Oosten teweeg gebracht waarbij Iran langzaam maar zeker de regionale supermacht is geworden naast Israel, voor het islamitische regime in Iran heeft Israel geen enkel bestaansrecht in het Midden Oosten, men duidt Israel bijna altijd aan als de zionistische entiteit om dat kracht bij te zetten, deze doctrine is gebaseerd op de Islam, het midden oosten is het grondgebied van de Islam (Dar al Islam) en daarin kan een niet islamitisch regime geen plaats hebben (dit is zuiver gebaseerd op de Koran ,maar het voert te ver om daar in dit artikel dieper op in te gaan)
Het allesoverstijgende doel van de vernietiging van Israel zoals openlijk gepropageerd door Iraanse leiders (zie website Achmadinejad http://www.president.ir/en/
linksonderaan bij speeches) heeft de aloude controverse tussen de soenieten en shiieten tijdelijk naar de achtergrond verdrongen, dit verklaart bijvoorbeeld waarom de soenietische organisatie Hamas haar lot volledig heeft verbonden aan het sjiitische Iran.
Iran wordt door sommige westerse landen aangeduid als een staatssponsor van terrorisme, dit is een korrekte aanduiding ,Iran sponsort palestijnse terreurbewegingen zoals Islamatische Jihad en Hamas, en aan de noordgrens van Israel heeft Iran een proxyleger in de vorm van de shiitische terreurorganisatie Hezbollah dat tegenwoordig Lebanon geheel controleert.
Ook heeft Iran een strategisch bondgenootschap met Syrie, er bestaan sterke aanwijzingen dat Syrie een illegaal kernwapenprogramma had dat op 6 september vorig jaar door Israelische gevechtsvliegtuigen werd vernietigd.
Iran heeft dus een situatie gecreeerd waarbij Israel ingesloten is door proxylegers die hun wapens en geld uit Teheran krijgen en die via terreur trachten Israel van binnenuit uit te hollen de Iraanse president heeft bij herhaling gezegd dat hij in het geheel geen kernwapen nodig zou hebben om Israel van de kaart te vegen en gaf daarbij aan dat het land van binnenuit wel zou imploderen .
, Maar de grootste bedreiging voor Israel gaat uit van het Iraanse nucleaire programma, over dit programma bestond in Israel vanaf de tijd dat Rabin premier was al de vrees dat het om een clandestien kernwapenprogramma zou gaan, sommigen beweren dat dit de reden was dat Rabin uiteindelijk besloot om Oslo een kans te geven, hij was beducht voor een situatie waarbij Israel een meerfrontenorlog zou moeten voeren, in het geval dat Iran Israel zou aanvallen
Inmiddels is er in Israel geen expert meer die nog twijfelt aan de aard van het Iraanse nucleaire programma, het gaat om een wapenprogramma.
De Israelische inlichtingendiensten hebben hun laatste inschatting bijgesteld en zeggen dat een Iraans kernwapen binnen een jaar realiteit zal zijn
er zijn ook andere duidelijke aanwijzingen dat deze Israelische analyse juist is, een van die aanwijzingen is de produktie van langeafstandsraketten die op vaste brandstof
werken, dergelijke raketten zijn bestemd voor het vervoer van een kernkop. geen twijfel over mogelijk.
Een ander aspekt dat belicht moet worden is het argument dat de laatste tijd door tegenstanders van de militaire optie wordt gebruikt over de zogenaamde MAD -doctrine ,die zou voorkomen dat een Iraans nucleair wapen ook werkelijk tegen israel gebruikt zou worden, deze MAD-doctrine (Mutual Anticipated Destruction) was de heersende strategie in de koude oorlog, het afschrikkingsprincipe daarvan voorkwam het daadwerkelijk gebruik van kernwapens .
Men wist dat een aanval met deze wapens de eigen vernietiging zou betekenen.
De tegenstanders van iedere militaire aktie tegen Iran beweren dat Iran het kernwapen niet zal gebruiken ,maar het alleen vanwege het machtsevenwicht met de US en Israel wil bezitten, sommigen gaan zover om te beweren dat het Midden Oosten er veiliger door zal worden.
Er zijn minimaal drie redenen waarom deze hypothese geen stand houdt,:
a) Iraanse leiders hebben openlijk gefilosofeerd over het MAD principe en verwierpen het met het argument dat Israel met een bom vernietigd kan worden en Iran een tegenaanval zou kunnen absorberen, omdat het slechts een minderheid van de bevolking het leven zou kosten
b) De Iran-Irak oorlog in de jaren tachtig heeft ons geleerd dat Iran er geen enkele moeite mee heeft om in het geval van oorlog duizenden en duizenden op te offeren (het ging daarbij voornamelijk om kinderen)
c) De 11-9 aanslag in de USA (en andere talloze aanslagen op kleinere schaal) hebben bewezen dat in de filosofie van Islamisten het verlies duizend, honderdduizend of een milioen mensenlevens niet een reden is om van een dergelijk aanvalsplan af te zien.
Israel heeft bij herhaling duidelijk gemaakt dat een Iraans kernwapen voor haar onacceptabel is, de voormalige Israelische minister van defensie Sneh (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1162378366509
gaf in een interview met de Jpost een jaar terug aan waarom ook zonder dat Iran het wapen zou gebruiken, het voor Israel onacceptabel is .
Hij noemde daarbij o.a , de nucleaire chantage die Iran op Israel kan plegen bij de Palestijnse kwestie, in andere woorden Israel zal geen militaire bewegingsruimte meer hebben om het palestijnse terrorisme te bestrijden.,; het Midden Oosten zal een ongekende nucleaire wapenwedloop te zien geven ,en inderdaad is dat nu al bijna het geval en op lange termijn zal het demografische konsekwenties hebben voor Israel, veel potentiele immigranten zullen afhaken en groepen Israeli's zullen hun toekomst elders gaan overwegen.
Tegelijker tijd is de Israelische positie altijd geweest dat dit probleem een mondiaal probleem is, het gaat de hele wereld aan, gezien de Iraanse aspiraties van werelddominantie en de rol die Iran speelt in de huidige oorlog tegen (islamitische) terreur.
Maar met het verstrijken van de tijd is duidelijk geworden dat het sanctieregime tegen Iran heeft gefaald, enerzijds door Europeese economische belangen, en ideologische- en economische verschillen van inzicht tussen de USA en China en Rusland, en anderzijds door de Iraanse opstelling en de explosie van de gas en olieprijzen waardoor Iran niet gevoelig genoeg bleek voor harde economische sancties.
Israel heeft een speciale verantwoording tegenover de joden in die zin dat een genocide op de joden nooit meer getolereerd zal worden, en dus zijn we nu in de fase gekomen dat de wellicht moeilijkste beslissing ooit voor een Israelische regering genomen moet gaan worden op korte termijn.
Tenzij de wereld alsnog wakker wordt , zal Israel doen wat het in Osirak Irak deed in 1981 en in Syrie op 6 september 2007.
Dit soort dilemma's voor Israelische regeringen is uniek in de wereld, er is namelijk geen enkel ander land dat rechtstreeks in zijn voortbestaan wordt bedreigd door buurstaten.
De voorbereidingen op een mogelijke aktie zijn al jaren aan de gang, ik herinner me goed de maanden na de 2e lebanonoorlog toen het Israelische luchtruim hele dagen vol was van schijngevechten tussen de gevechtsvliegtuigen van de IAF en hetzelfde gebeurde begin juni dit jaar , toen de vliegaktiviteit dagenlang hoger was dan normaal , en naar nu bekend werd de grootste oefening ooit werd gehouden door de IAF ,waarbij het griekse luchtruim als het Iraanse luchtruim moest dienen.
Ook de officiele Israelische politiek naar buiten toe is gewijzigd, er wordt niet meer gesproken over het mondiale probleem maar over de urgentheid voor Israel om het probleem zelf aan te pakken.
De vraag is dus bijna niet meer of een militaire aanval is te verwachten ,maar wanneer.
Hierover lopen alleen speculaties, het is wel opvallend dat de laatste weken van juni een komen en gaan te zien gaven van het topechelon van het Amerikaanse leger het hoofdkwartier van de IDF in Tel Aviv, de stafchef van het Amerikaanse leger bijv. was hier de laatste maanden al twee keer en hij kwam daarvoor in tien jaar niet een keer.
Bush zelf is hier ook al twee keer geweest dit jaar.
Mijn inschatting is dat een Amerikaanse aanval nog altijd een optie is voor Bush, een incident in de straat van Hormuz is voldoende om een kettingreaktie op gang te brengen om de Amerikaanse aanval te rechtvaardigen, in dat geval is het maken van een case naar het congres en het Amerikaanse publiek niet meer nodig voor Bush.
Voor Israel zou het absoluut de beste optie zijn, het Amerikaanse leger beschikt over vliegdekschepen in de golf, Israel niet, ze hebben stealth bommenwerpers, Israel niet.
Israel is niet in staat een campagne te voeren om de 24 verspreid over Iran liggende nucleaire installaties dagen lang aan te vallen ,de Amerikanen kunnen dat zonder problemen wel, maar de belangrijkste reden waarom het voor Israel beter is om zelf geen aanval uit te voeren ligt in de fall-out van zo'n aanval.
De fall-out in militaire zin is al genoeg reden tot zorg want het zal niet alleen Iran zijn dat zal reageren op een Israelische aanval, de Palestijnen en Hezbollah zullen
zich mengen in deze strijd en gezien de alliantie met Iran is een front met Syrie niet ondenkbaar.
Dit verklaart waarschijnlijk de recente besprekingen tussen Syrie en Israel ,die tot doel hebben Syrie uit het pact met Iran los te weken.
De fall- out voor Israel zal zich niet beperken tot een militaire reaktie, gezien de te verwachten verdere explosie van de olieprijs bij zo'n aanval op Iran zal de wereldeconomie ontwricht worden en zal Israel verantwoordelijk worden gehouden, het nu al zorgwekkende anti-Israel klimaat in grote delen van de wereld zal voor een waarschijnlijke boycott tegen Israel gaan zorgen en de woede in de Islamitische wereld tegen Israel zal het risico in zich houden dat er een mondiaal konflikt uit ontstaat.
Het gunstigste militaire scenario zou zijn een Israelische/Amerikaanse aanval, het zou de recente stroom bezoeken van militaire -en politieke leiders aan Israel en v.v. Israelische leiders aan Washington kunnen verklaren. in een dergelijk scenario zal de fall-out voor Israel in militaire en politieke zin minder gevaarlijk zijn.
De VS zijn nog altijd de enige supermacht in de wereld, en zijn minder gevoelig voor de fall-out vergeleken met Israel.
Ook Nederland heeft een grote verantwoordelijkheid te dragen in het zich opbouwende konflikt, Zembla in 2005 zond een documentaire uit getiteld "De Nederlandse Atoombom" (http://zembla.vara.nl/Maatschappelijk-debat.2064.0.html?&tx_ttnews[backPid]=2063&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1619&cHash=1f6a49bc54)
oa. uit deze uitzending bleek dat de ingenieur van het Pakistaanse nucleaire wapenprogramma Abdul Qaudeer Khan in Nederland studeerde en daar spioneerde in Almelo en Petten, en vervolgens met deze informatie in staat was het Pakistaanse kernwapen te bouwen, hierbij kreeg hij alle hulp van een nederlander Henk Sleebos die later tot een jaar gevangenisstraf werd veroordeeld wegens overtreding van exportwetten.
De aktiviteiten van Khan en Sleebos waren bekend bij overheidsdiensten en regeringsfunktionarissen in Nederland maar die reageerden inadequaat, Iran verkreeg zijn blauwdrukken voor kernwapenproduktie via Abdul Khan, Iran heeft dit toegegeven aan de IAEA in november 2005 (hetzelfde geldt voor Noord Korea en Lybie)
In dit licht bezien draagt Nederland ook verantwoordelijkheid voor de onmogelijke situatie van Israel vs Iran, maar Israel hoeft niet te hopen op Nederlandse aktie tegen Iran, zelfs een motie die werd ingediend in de tweede kamer door de PVV waarbij Nederland Israel in geval van oorlog met Iran zou gaan steunen werd met 141 tegen 9 stemmen verworpen in de tweede kamer eind juni 2008.
Resumerend lijkt het er sterk op dat we afstevenen op een grote crisis in de wereld, deze crisis had opnieuw voorkomen kunnen worden wanneer de internationale gemeenschap vanaf het begin op de ontwikkelingen in Iran anders had gereageerd, vanaf de tijd van ayatollah Khomeiny heeft men niet onder ogen willen zien dat de aspiraties van de Iraanse islamitische revolutie niet beperkt waren tot Iran, daarna werd de Iraanse militaire opbouw en het Iraanse nucleaire programma, verkeerd beoordeeld en greep men pas heel laat naar het VNsanctiewapen, te laat naar alle waarschijnlijkheid
De stemming in Israel is derhalve opnieuw er een van "isolatie", er is nooit veel vertrouwen geweest in de Europeese diplomatie en het vertrouwen in een Amerikaans ingrijpen tegen Iran is aan het dalen, en het besef groeit dat de wereld opnieuw zal toekijken wanneer Israel wederom een oorlog om te overleven moet gaan voeren, dit keer zou dat een nucleaire oorlog kunnen worden, G'D verhoede
De wereldgeschiedenis heeft de volkeren geleerd dat men niets leert van wat er te leren viel uit de geschiedenis.........het is TWEE VOOR TWAALF
Yochanan Visser Israel
http://zembla.vara.nl/Maatschappelijk-debat.2064.0.html?&tx_ttnews[backPid]=2063&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1619&cHash=1f6a49bc54 |
|
Iran’s Defiance of Nuclear Negotiations
|
History of Iran’s Defiance of Nuclear Negotiations
Geneva Talks on Iranian Nuclear Standoff to be Held July 19
In August 2002, Iranian dissidents revealed that Iran had a secret nuclear energy program and was in the process of building two facilities capable of producing material for a nuclear weapon [1]. A month later, Iran told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to advance its nuclear program, specifically saying that it was “embarking on a long term plan to construct nuclear power plants.” [2]
Soon after, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and other key officials traveled to Iran and discovered “extensive concealment activities” regarding Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs[3] . This raised great concern among world leaders, the IAEA and the UN because Iran had not fulfilled its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To date, Iran has ignored the international community’s concerns, prompting leaders of several countries to speak out about the matter.
“It is in the interest of Iran to choose the path of dialogue and give up its nuclear ambitions,” French Defense Minister Herve Morin said. [4]
Said German Chancellor Angela Merkel, “Iran’s nuclear program is one of our biggest security policy concerns.” [5]
International Atomic Energy Agency
At a meeting of international representatives in Vienna on Feb. 25, chief UN nuclear inspector Olli Heinonen submitted evidence that Iran was working on projects "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon." [6]
Heinonen also presented a video of Iran’s efforts to design a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3 missile, an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of hitting Israel and American military bases in the Middle East [7]. On July 9, Iran tested its medium-range ballistics missiles, including the Shahab-3. [8]
Heinonen also reported that Iran was testing high-intensity explosives necessary for a nuclear detonation around the town of Parchin, 21 miles (35 km) from Tehran. [9] The Iranian government claimed that the tests were for the purpose of improving the design of airbags. [10]
U.S. Intelligence
The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran stated with a high degree of certainty that until fall 2003, the Iranian military was working to develop nuclear weapons [11]. The report also stated that after 2003, there was a high probability that nuclear weapons development was halted for at least several years [12]. Intelligence sources also indicated that Iran does not currently possess a nuclear weapon [13]. However, Iran resumed its uranium enrichment activities in January 2006. [14]
Uranium enrichment is necessary for the production of weapons-grade uranium.
According to the NIE, Iran could manufacture a nuclear weapon in late 2009, [15] but it is more likely to be capable of producing the requisite amount of highly enriched uranium between 2010 and 2015. [16]
Mike McConnell, director of U.S. national intelligence, stated on Feb. 26 that "Our estimate is [that the Iranians] intend to have a nuclear weapon." [17]
Iran’s Culture of Negotiation and its Impact on Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran’s negotiating style is an important aspect of the country’s continued nuclear ambitions.
Iranian government negotiators have become known for their ambiguity [18]. This is, at least in part, a product of Iranian cultural and religious norms [19]. This legacy does not preclude sincerity in negotiations, but it does mean that initial bargaining positions often fail to reflect actual Iranian goals in the negotiating process. [20]
Iranians use a variety of tactics to gauge the determination of their opponents. They typically engage in extensive pre-negotiations, discussing marginal issues as a strategy to gain information about the other side [21]. Negotiators in inferior power positions sometimes deny even the most incontrovertible truths to throw opposing negotiators off-balance. [22]
One particularly frustrating trait for Western negotiators is the Iranian preference for keeping the duration of agreements short, which conflicts with common Western strategies of confidence-building.
Recent works by American researchers document in detail the failure of American attempts to engage the Islamic regime through diplomacy, from the fall of the Shah until the present day [23]. Two works in particular, one written by a former CIA analyst and the other by an academic, suggest that Iranian leaders have interpreted previous American attempts at diplomatic engagement as a sign of American weakness. [24]
The timeline below details the failures of years of multilateral diplomacy aimed at dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. While conducting these negotiations, Iran has continued to act belligerently, threatening to attack oil facilities, U.S. assets and Israel. Moreover, IAEA inspectors have suggested that Iran is simultaneously developing armaments capable of carrying and detonating a nuclear payload.
Timeline: Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Actions
July 9, 2008: Iran tests nine medium- to long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel and U.S. military bases in the region. [25]
July 4, 2008: Iran offers a formal response to the U.N.’s June 16 negotiation proposal. While indicating Iran’s willingness to negotiate, the response fails to address the central issue of whether Iran would put a freeze on its uranium enrichment activities. [26]
June 18, 2008: Iran forwards to the IAEA the text of its proposed package for constructive negotiations. The proposal presents a number of issues that Iran believes should comprise a framework for negotiations. These include security, regional and international developments, nuclear energy, terrorism, democracy, drug control, environmental conservation, and economic, technological, and commercial energy cooperation. [27]
June 16, 2008: The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, along with Germany, offer Iran a broad framework for negotiations on issues ranging from nuclear energy to agriculture, civil aviation, and infrastructure. This is done on the condition that Iran freeze its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities at their current rate of development – implicitly accepting the idea of a nuclear Iran. [28]
May 26, 2008: Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, circulates a report to the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors [29]. The report finds that Iran is withholding information critical for determining whether it is trying to produce nuclear weapons: specifically, Iranian work on high-explosive testing, missile design and the “green salt project” - undeclared studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (“green salt”). [30]
Mar. 28, 2008: Iran issues a statement in response to Security Council Resolution 1803 in which it affirms its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It further claims that the United States and three European countries provided “false and erroneous” information to the IAEA concerning Iran’s nuclear program, and that the actions taken by the Security Council contradict the United Nations Charter and are in violation of “peremptory norms of international law.” [31]
Mar. 3, 2008: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1803, implementing a new round of sanctions against Iran for its continued refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy water-related (a commonly used moderator in nuclear reactors) activity. The resolution calls for states to exercise “vigilance and restraint” in dealing with the transit through their territories of individuals, material and equipment related to the Iranian nuclear program. It also extends the freezing of assets belonging to persons or entities supporting Iran’s nuclear activity and calls upon states to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories that do business with Iranian banks. [32]
Feb. 25, 2008: Olli Heinonen, chief U.N. nuclear inspector, organizes a meeting of international representatives on Feb. 25 in Vienna at which he submits video evidence that Iran is working on projects "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon." [33] Heinonen also reveals at the Feb. 25 meeting that Iran has been testing high-intensity explosives necessary for a nuclear detonation around the town of Parchin, 21 miles (35 km) from Tehran. [34]
Jan. 24, 2008: The U.N. Security Council agrees to impose a new set of sanctions on Iran. [35]
Dec. 3, 2007: The U.S. National Intelligence Council releases an unclassified summary of the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. [36]
Nov. 27, 2007: Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar reports the building of the Ashura missile. The missile has a range of 1,240 miles (2,000 km). [37]
Nov. 10, 2007: Commander Gholamreza Karimi of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards asserts, "In the near future, the artillery and missiles of the [Islamic Revolutionary] Guards Corps will undergo a great transformation as far as technique, tactics and technology are concerned." [38]
Sep. 22, 2007: Deputy Head of the Iranian Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research Brig-Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi says that several training and military aircraft, transportation planes, different kinds of helicopters, the Shahab-3 missiles with horizontal charge and Fateh-3 missiles have been produced in Iran. He asserts that the horizontal charge model of Shahab-3's functioning time has been drastically reduced compared to the former type. Naqdi adds that the Fateh-3 missile is also known for the high degree of precision with which it can hit targets. [39]
Sep. 22, 2007: The "Qadr-1" missile and its launcher are displayed in Iran’s parade of its armed forces. The Qadr-1 is a ballistic missile with a warhead and an explosive. It has the capacity to travel 310 miles (500 km) more than the Shahab-3. [40]
Sep. 18, 2007: Iran threatens
to fire long-range missiles at American targets in the Middle East should the United States launch an attack against Iran. A senior commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General Mohammed Hassan Koussechi, warns, "If the United States is saying that they have identified 2,000 targets in Iran, then what is certain is that it is the Americans who are all around Iran and are equally our targets. We have reached capacities that allow us to hit the enemy at a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles)." [41]
Aug. 30, 2007: ElBaradei circulates among the IAEA Board of Governors his latest report, “Implementation of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” which covers developments since the report of May 23, 2007. It finds that Iran has not suspended enrichment-related activities and is continuing its construction of a Fuel Enrichment Plant and a heavy-water reactor at Natanz and Arak, respectively. The report also finds that the IAEA is uncertain as to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program. [42]
Aug. 22, 2007: Iran develops a remote-controlled launch system that can be used to operate dozens of unmanned Shahab-3 ballistic missile launchers in underground bunkers. After recent upgrades, the Shahab-3 ballistic missiles in Iran's possession may have a target range of 1,240 miles (2,000 km). [43]
June 22, 2007: The IAEA and Iran agree to draft a plan of action to address outstanding concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. [44]
June 11, 2007: Deputy Interior Minister of Iran Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr warns, "All American bases in the region are within the reach of our weapons. If the United States attacked Iran, U.S. interests would be in danger everywhere in the world." Iran has an array of medium-range missiles and claims that its longer-range Shahab-3 missile has a reach of 1,240 miles (2,000 km), which would put U.S. bases on the Arabian Peninsula within reach. [45]
June 10, 2007: Admiral Ali Shamkhani, senior defense adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warns that Gulf States providing the United States with military cooperation will be key targets of a barrage of retaliatory ballistic missiles. Shamkhani stresses that missiles will be launched at both U.S. military bases and strategic targets such as oil refineries and power stations in the event of such an attack against Iran. The attacks on Arab states will be in addition to air strikes on Israel, which have been threatened in the past. [46]
May 23, 2007: An IAEA report discloses that despite diplomatic efforts to suspend Iran's enrichment-related activities, Iran continues to proceed with its nuclear program. The report, issued by the director general, reveals the following: [47]
• Since Feb. 22, 2007 Iran has continued to test cascade machines – a group of centrifuge machines connected in a series - at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); [48]
• Iran continues to install centrifuges - machines used to separate materials of different density - despite its agreements to suspend the import, manufacture and use of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge components in 2004; [49]
• Iran has fed approximately 572 lbs. (260 kg) of UF6 (uranium hexaflouride - also fuel for nuclear reactors) into the cascades at the PFEP; [50]
• Since April 13, 2007, Iran has not provided the IAEA access to the Arak reactor site to carry out inspections; [51]
• Despite IAEA safeguards and U.N. sanctions requiring Iran to suspend its heavy- water production, satellite imagery indicates that it continues to engage in such activity; [52]
• Iran has not agreed to any of the required transparency measures that are essential to clarify certain aspects of the scope and nature of its nuclear program. These measures include providing information to the agency concerning alleged studies on the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4, high explosives testing, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle. [53]
May 17, 2007: North Korea is suspected to have used a launch-pad in Iran to test a new missile capable of hitting American bases in the Pacific island of Guam. The missile, named after the Musudan testing range in North Korea, had been shown off to the public at a vast military parade in the capital of Pyongyang. If the test did take place, it could have been a quid pro quo for North Korea's alleged agreement to share with Tehran the results of the nuclear test it carried out last October. [54]
May 16, 2007: The U.S. State Department estimates Iran could acquire long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Europe and the United States in fewer than eight years. The State Department report stresses that foreign assistance could be a key determinant in how quickly Iran progresses, citing the 2006 purchase of 18 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from North Korea modeled after the reverse-engineered Russian SS-N-6 'Serb' (R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile. [55]
May 10, 2007: Russian Army Chief of General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy asserts that Iran currently possesses only the liquid fuel missile Shahab-3, whose range doesn’t exceed 930 miles (1,500 km) if carrying a warhead up to 1,110 pounds (500 kg). Baluyevskiy stresses that this missile can only reach as far as Israel, thus claims of a threat posed to America and Europe are "extremely overstated." Baluyevskiy concludes that in order to create a ballistic missile with the range of at least 1,860 miles (3,000 km), Iran needs a principally different level of technology and much bigger industrial capacities. According to Baluyevskiy, "[There is only] a chance in a thousand that Iran will soon be able to build missile capabilities to reach Europe and all the more the USA." [56]
Mar. 24, 2007: The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1747, reaffirming that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program, including suspending all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as well as heavy water related projects. The resolution also encourages all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of all "items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related activities.” [57]
Mar. 16, 2007: Lieut. Gen. Henry Obering, the U.S. general in charge of deploying an anti-ballistic missile shield in Europe, says such a shield would be operational by 2011 to provide protection to most of the continent against any possible threats from Iran. The planned operation date relies on Obering's prediction that negotiations to deploy parts of the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic will conclude by the end of 2007. A delay would make the United States and Europe vulnerable to possible attack from Iran as, according to Obering, Tehran is likely to reach "long-range, intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missile capability" within eight years. [58]
Mar. 16, 2007: In comments made to reporters in Berlin, U.S. Missile Program Head Lieut. Gen. Henry Obering stresses that the planned 10 interceptor missiles in Poland are meant to protect Europe and the U.S. from a possible missile attack from Iran. Russian officials indicate their disdain and the head of Russia’s Missile Fleet warns that such a base in Poland could be targeted if it any way threatens Russian security. The anticipated completion date of this Europe-based defense system is sometime in 2011 or 2012. According to Obering, “We are very much concerned about the capability of the Iranians to reach almost all of Europe by that point and certainly they may also be able to reach the United States.” [59]
Mar. 7, 2007: ElBaradei states that Iran's actions "render the Agency unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." The IAEA's "confidence about the nature of Iran's program has been shaken [and] will only be restored when Iran takes the long overdue decision to explain and answer all the Agency's questions and concerns about its past nuclear activities in an open and transparent manner." [60]
Jan. 30, 2007: U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly indicates in a speech to the George C. Marshall Institute that the Pentagon predicts that Iran will develop an intercontinental ballistic missile with the ability to reach the United States shore by 2015. O’Reilly cites Iran’s recent plans to build a space launcher stressing that this capability would aid in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Pentagon, he says, is in the stages of creating a “multiple kill vehicle” that could defend against 10 or more enemy warheads from a single booster. [61]
Dec. 27, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1737, demanding that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. [62]
June 6, 2006: Iran is offered a new proposal on its controversial nuclear program. Although the specifics of the proposal are not unveiled, the offer is known to include economic, technological and political incentives. The offer is believed to include a commitment from the P-5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to: help Iran build light-water power plants through joint projects; support Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization; and a U.S. pledge to lift certain economic sanctions against Iran to allow the purchase of agricultural appliances and the sale of Boeing aircraft parts. Concerning uranium enrichment - a major point of contention - the proposal requires Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities; however, this requirement does not preclude the future possibility that Iran could eventually develop indigenous enrichment capabilities once all outstanding questions have been resolved and international confidence has been restored in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Iran's response is cautious. Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, states that "the proposals contain positive steps and also some ambiguities which s
ould be removed." [63]
May 31, 2006: In an apparent policy shift, the United States announces its intention to directly participate in negotiations provided that Tehran suspends all enrichment and reprocessing activities. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says, “To underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects of success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran's representatives.” [64]
May 9, 2006: In an effort to forge U.N. Security Council unity, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany agree to delay UNSC action and postpone voting on a resolution drafted by France and the United Kingdom. Instead, the representatives of the EU-3 will work on devising a comprehensive package of incentives and disincentives to bring Iran to the negotiating table. [65]
May 3, 2006: Britain and France present their draft Security Council resolution, which calls on Iran to "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development...and suspend the construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water." The resolution also urges states to restrict nuclear trade with Iran by "preventing the transfer of items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and missile programs." While the resolution does not specify punitive actions in the case of Iran's noncompliance, by citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it leaves the door open for possible sanctions and other enforcement measures. [66]
Apr. 29, 2006: The Iranians indicate their willingness to allow greater access to IAEA inspectors under the condition that the Security Council returns the case to the IAEA Board of Governors. [67]
Apr. 28, 2006: The Director General of the IAEA submits his report on Iran to the IAEA Board and the Security Council as requested by the March 29 Security Council presidential statement. As with previous reports, the Director General can not provide evidence to verify that Iran's nuclear program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. [68]
Apr. 23, 2006: Iran's foreign ministry spokesman, Hamid-Reza Asefi, declares that Iran's nuclear activities are "irreversible." He also states that the Iranians are "determined not to give up our rights to nuclear energy, and suspension of relevant activities are not on our agenda." [69]
Apr. 11, 2006: Iranian President Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has successfully enriched uranium. He states that consequently Iran has officially "joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology." [70]
Mar. 29, 2006: The Security Council issues a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development. The statement also requests the director general of the IAEA to report back within 30 days on Iranian compliance with the steps required by the Board. [71]
Mar. 20, 2006: The five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany meet in Berlin to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. The EU-3 and United States push for a Security Council statement that would call on Iran to reinstate full suspension of all enrichment related activities. While the EU-3, backed by the US, urges the statement to specify a deadline by which the Director General of the IAEA would be required to report back to the Security Council on Iran's compliance, China and Russia express their reservations about imposing an immediate deadline. [72]
Mar. 8, 2006: In his remarks at the conclusion of the IAEA Board meeting, Director General ElBaradei emphasizes the importance of finding a comprehensive political settlement, stating that it is entirely up to the Security Council to decide when to take up the issue of Iran's nuclear program, and if it decides to at all, what action it deems necessary. [73]
Feb. 27, 2006: Director General ElBaradei issues a report for consideration at the Board of Governors' meeting on March 6, 2006. The report provides an update on the developments of Iran’s nuclear program since November 2005. It states that although the IAEA has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, uncertainties remain about the scope and the nature of Iran's nuclear program. [74]
Feb. 7, 2006: Iran requests the IAEA to remove the seals and surveillance systems from safeguarded Iranian facilities. [75]
Feb. 4, 2006: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution requesting the Agency's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, share all IAEA reports and resolutions relating to the Iran's nuclear program with the UN Security Council. [76]
Jan. 31, 2006: The IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards submits an updated brief about the latest developments on the implementation of the safeguard agreements. According to the brief, Iran handed over a document dealing with uranium metal that is related to the production of nuclear weapons components. [77]
Jan. 18, 2006: The representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the IAEA send a letter to the chair of the IAEA Board of Governors requesting that a special meeting be held to discuss the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran and resolutions related to Iran. The special meeting is scheduled for Feb. 2. [78]
Jan. 10, 2006: Despite continuous requests to suspend its activities, Iran removes IAEA seals on enrichment-related equipment and material at Natanz and at two related storage and testing locations, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique. [79]
Jan. 8, 2006: The Secretariat receives a note verbale from the Permanent Mission of Iran stating that the "intended scale of R&D is small" and that "all reprocessing in relation to this small scale R&D will be carried out." [80]
Jan. 7, 2006: Iran requests that the IAEA remove 52 Agency seals installed at the facilities of Natanz, Pars Trash, and Farayand Technique before January 9, 2006. [81]
Jan. 3, 2006: Mohamed ElBaradei informs the Board of Governors that Iran has decided to resume "R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy program which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension.” [82]
Nov. 27, 2005: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the EU-3) agree to hold talks with Iran on resuming negotiations on the country's disputed nuclear program, which broke down in August 2005. As a precondition, Iran must be ready to discuss a Russian proposal allowing Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear program but without uranium enrichment capabilities. Uranium enrichment, the most sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that can be used to make fuel for bombs, would be transferred to Russia under a joint venture. [83]
Nov. 24-25, 2005: The Director General reports to the Board of Governors that Iran has provided additional documentation, permitted interviews with relevant individuals, and allowed further access. While the Agency intends to continue its efforts to clarify the extent and nature of Iran's nuclear program, Iran is urged to cooperate further on the scope and chronology of its centrifuge enrichment program. However, the Agency observes no deviations from Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment activities, and the Board adopts no resolution on the issue. [84]
Nov. 21, 2005: Iranian lawmakers vote to oblige their government to stop allowing snap UN checks of its atomic sites and to resume uranium enrichment if Tehran is referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. [85]
Sep. 24, 2005: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that finds Iran's failures and breaches to constitute non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreements and calls on Iran to return to the negotiating process. [86]
Sep. 2, 2005: After the IAEA conducts environmental tests, samples reveal types of nuclear testing that Iran did not include in its inventory of declared nuclear material, calling into question the completeness of Iran's declarations about its centrifuge enrichment activities. The IAEA continues to urge Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities, including the production of nuclear materials. [87]
Aug. 11, 2005: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that urges Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment-related activities and to re-instate the IAEA seals that were removed at its uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan. [88]
Aug. 10, 2005: Iran begins to remove the seals on the process lines and the UF4 at the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan. IAEA Director General ElBaradei calls for maximum restraint, no unilateral actions, and continued negotiations by all parties. [89]
Aug. 8, 2005: Iran begins feeding uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at the UCF. [90]
Aug. 1, 2005: Iran notifies the IAEA that it has decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the UCF in Esfahan. [91]
Nov. 29, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that welcomes Iran's voluntary decision to "continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities." The Board also expresses "its strong concern that Iran's policy of concealment up to October 2003 has resulted in many breaches of Iran's obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement." [92]
Nov. 25, 2004: Director General ElBaradei reports to the Board of Governors that two important issues remain: the origin of the low-enriched and highly enriched uranium particle contamination found at various locations in Iran and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs. [93]
Sep. 18, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution stating it "deeply regrets" that Iran's suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities "fell significantly short of the
gency's understandings of those commitments." [94]
June 18, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that deplores Iran's lack of timely cooperation with the IAEA and failure to act in full compliance with its safeguards obligations. [95]
June 1, 2004: Director General ElBaradei, in his report to the Board of Governors, identifies three outstanding concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program: the origin of highly enriched uranium at several nuclear sites, previously undeclared centrifuge technology and Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. [96]
May 21, 2004: Iran submits its initial declaration under the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement. [97]
May 18, 2004: Iran sends a letter to the IAEA clarifying the suspension agreement, stating, "Iran has not, at any time, made any undertaking not to produce feed material for the enrichment process. The decision taken for voluntary and temporary suspension is based on clearly defined scope which does not include suspension of production of UF6." The IAEA disagrees with Iran’s analysis. [98]
Apr. 7, 2004: During a visit to Iran, Director General ElBaradei announces that Iran has agreed to accelerate its cooperation with the IAEA in addition to a joint action plan with a timetable to deal with outstanding issues. [99]
Mar. 15, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution on the IAEA's verification of Iran's nuclear program, noting "outstanding issues" and questions, and requesting Director General ElBaradei to report back to the Board on these matters before the end of May. [100]
Mar. 8, 2004: Director General ElBaradei expresses his concern to the Board of Governors that Iran's declaration of Oct. 21, 2003 did not include any reference to its possession of P-2 centrifuge designs and related research and development, which he views as a setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency. [101]
Dec. 18, 2003: Iran signs the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement, granting IAEA inspectors greater authority in verifying the country's nuclear program. [102]
Nov. 26, 2003: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution on the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [103]
Nov. 10, 2003: In a letter to the IAEA, Iran's representative conveys his government's acceptance of the text of the Additional Protocol and officially announces that Iran has agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. [104]
Oct. 31, 2003: Director General ElBaradei remarks that the active and intense period of talks and inspections, begun on October 2, is making good progress. [105]
Oct. 21, 2003: Iran and the EU-3 agree on measures aimed at settling all outstanding issues. Iran agrees to engage in full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA in order to address and resolve all requirements and outstanding issues while clarifying and correcting any possible failures and deficiencies raised by the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran decides to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, commence ratification procedures for the Protocol, and to voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. [106]
Sep. 12, 2003: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling on Iran to accelerate cooperation with the IAEA and provide full transparency. [107]
Sep. 8-9, 2003: Director General ElBaradei urges greater cooperation from Iran in order for the IAEA to complete its verification. ElBaradei comments, "…it is obviously not sufficient to rely just on the rights granted in the safeguards agreement," and emphasizes the need for "full transparency and proactive co-operation by Iran." [108]
July 9, 2003: Director General ElBaradei meets with Iranian President Khatami; they agree that a team of senior IAEA experts will remain in Iran to hold technical discussions with Iranian experts on outstanding issues. [109]
June 16-20, 2003: The Board of Governors discusses allegations made in a report by Director General ElBaradei that Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreements. [110]
Feb. 22-23, 2003: ElBaradei leads an IAEA delegation to Iran and discovers that Iran has two undeclared nuclear production facilities in Natanz and an undeclared enrichment facility, laboratory, and storage facility in Tehran, and that it is building more production facilities in Arak and Esfahan. [111]
Sept. 2002: Iran tells the IAEA of its plans to advance its nuclear program, specifically that it is "embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6,000 MW (megawatts) within two decades." [112]
Footnotes
[1] Johnson, Zachary K., “Iran going nuclear, background to a crisis,” Frontline World, May 2005, retrieved July 13, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran403/background.html
[2] H.E. Reza Aghazadeh, "Statement at the 46th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency," IAEA, Sept.16, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline.shtml#september02
[3] Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf
[4] Wahab, Siraj and Al-Saadi, Samir: “We´ll Pressure Iran on Nuke," Arab News, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.arabnews.com/services/print/print.asp?artid=102963&d=29&m=10&y=2007&hl='We'll%20Pressure%20Iran%20on%20Nuke
[5] “Merkel: Iran our grave security concern,” PressTV, Dec. 27, 2007
[6] Broad, William and David Sanger, "Meeting on arms data reignites Iran debate," The New York Times, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/middleeast/03nuke.html?_r=1&oref=login
[7] Ibid.
[8] "Iran tests missiles, state media reports," Reuters, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-iran-missiles-test.html?hp
[9] “Tests for Iranian Bomb – Tehran,” Intelligence Online, Mar. 13, 2008.
[10] Ibid.
[11] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,” National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,” National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Bar, Shmuel, “Iran: cultural values, self images, and negotiation behavior,” Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference, Oct. 2004, retrieved July 13, 2008 from www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2614Iranianself.pdf
[2] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23]Pollack, Kenneth. 2004. "The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America," New York: Random House; Ledeen, Michael A. 2007. The Iranian Time Bomb. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
[24] Ibid.
[25]"Iran tests missiles, state media reports," Reuters, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-iran-missiles-test.html?hp
[26]Sciolino, Elaine, “Iran responds obliquely to nuclear plan,” The New York Times, July 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/world/middleeast/05iran.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
[27] “Communication dated 16 June 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of the "Islamic Republic of Iran's proposed package for constructive negotiation," IAEA Information Circular, June 18, 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc729.pdf
[28] “Text of diplomatic offer to Iran,” June 16, 2008, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/Diplomatic_Offer_16June2008.pdf
[29] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran”
[30] “Iran holds back nuclear details, IAEA says,” CNN.com, May 26, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/26/iran.nuclear/index.html
[31] “Communication dated Mar. 26, 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc724.pdf
[32] “Resolution 1803,” United Nationals Security Council, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm
[33] Broad, William and David Sanger, "Meeting on arms data reignites Iran debate," The New York Times, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/middleeast/03nuke.html?_r=1&oref=login
[34] “Tests for Iranian Bomb – Tehran,” Intelligence Online, Mar. 13, 2008.
[35] Kulish, Nicholas, “Agreement on proposal for new Iran sanctions,” The New York Times, Jan. 23, 2008
[36] Spector, Leonard S., “Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. National Intelligence Estimate,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,” retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/071206.htm
[37]"Iran builds 2,000 km-range Ashura Missile - defense minister," Fars News Agency, 27 November 2007; "Iran adds Ashura to Missile Lineup," Jane's Defense Weekly, Nov. 28, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[38] “Latest transformations concerning the Guards Corps acquiring artillery, new military missiles,” Hemayat, Nov. 10, 2007; “Iran able to build missiles with more than 2,000-km range, says MP,” Fars News Agency, Nov. 11, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[39] "Iranian armed forces official outlines weapons production achievements," Iranian News Agency (IRNA), Sep. 22, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[40] "Iran displays Qadr-1 missile at military exercise," Fars News Agency, Sep. 22, 2007; "Iran Presents Ghadr - A 'New' Ballistic Missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, Oct. 3, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[41]"Iran threatens missile attacks on US targets," The Daily Telegraph [London], Sep. 18, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[42] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Statements by the Director General, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n013.html#iran
[43]"Iran develops remote-controlled launch system for Shihab-3 missiles," The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 22, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[44]“IAEA and Iran Agree to Draft "Work Plan" to Address Nuclear Stand-Off,” IAEA, June 22, 2007, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/iran_negotiator.html
[45] "We can bomb US bases: Iran," Hobart Mercury [Australia], June 11, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[46] "Iran threatens Gulf blitz if US hits nuclear plants," Sunday Times [London], June 10, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[47]"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, May 23, 2007, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf ,p.2
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50]Ibid.
[51]Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54]"N Korea 'uses Iranian site to test new missile,'" The Daily Telegraph, May 17, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[55] "US Estimates Iran Will Be Able to Strike US by 2015," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 16, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[56] "Russia general says Iran missile threat overestimated," ITAR-TASS, May 10, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[57] “Resolution 1747,” United Nations Security Council, Mar. 24, 2007, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf
[58] “Europe missile shield planned for 2011; U.S. officer, in Berlin, warns against delay,” The International Herald Tribune, Mar. 16, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[59]“General says missile defense system ‘no threat to Russia’,” Turkish Daily News, Mar. 16, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[60] Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, "Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors," IAEA, March 5, 2007, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n004.html#iran
[61] “Iran may develop ICBM before 2015: U.S. paper,” Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 30, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html
[62] United Nationals Security Council, “Resolution 1737,” Dec. 27, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm
[63] “Chronology of Key Events Related to Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Iran,” International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation for Studies, published June 16, 2006, retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060120.htm
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91]Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA, Sept. 2, 2005 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf , pg.1
[92] “Chronology of Key Events Related to Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Iran,” International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation for Studies, published June 16, 2006, retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060120.htm
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98]Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA, Sept. 1, 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf , p. 6, Annex 11
[99] “Chronology of Key Events Related to Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Iran,” International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation for Studies, published June 16, 2006, retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060120.htm
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111]Ibid.
[112]H.E. Reza Aghazadeh, "Statement at the 46th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency," IAEA, Sept.16, 2006, Ibid.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline.shtml#september02 , pg.3
The Israel Project is an international non-profit organization devoted to educating the press and the public about Israel while promoting security, freedom and peace. The Israel Project provides journalists, leaders and opinion-makers accurate information about Israel. The Israel Project is not related to any government or government agency.
Board of Advisors: Sen. Evan Bayh (IN), Sen. Ben Cardin (MD), Sen. Saxby Chambliss (GA), Sen. Tom Coburn (OK), Sen. Norm Coleman (MN), Sen. Susan Collins (ME), Sen. Judd Gregg (NH), Sen. Joe Lieberman (CT), Sen. Ben Nelson (NE), Sen. Gordon Smith (OR), Sen. Arlen Specter (PA), Sen. Ron Wyden (OR), Rep. Rob Andrews (NJ), Rep. Shelley Berkley (NV), Rep. Tom Davis (VA), Rep. Eliot Engel (NY), Rep. Frank Pallone (NJ), Rep. Jon Porter (NV), Rep. John Sarbanes (MD), Rep. Jim Saxton (NJ), Rep. Brad Sherman (CA), Rep. Joe Wilson (SC), Actor and Director Ron Silver |
|
DE IRAANSE BOM: UITEINDELIJK STAAT ISRAEL ALLEEN
|
Deel 1
| Deel 2
DE IRAANSE BOM: UITEINDELIJK STAAT ISRAEL ALLEEN
Iran praat met het Westen, Israel is stil.
Onlangs werden in Geneve gesprekken gehouden over het Iraanse nucleaire programma waarbij voor het eerst de VS vertegenwoordigd was.
De optimistische geluiden die na afloop van die gesprekken doorklonken werden in Israel ook gehoord en met scepsis beantwoord. De reactie van de Israelische regering was totale "radiostilte".
De hoofdredacteur van de Jerusalem Post schreef........... LEES VERDER BIJ DEEL 2
een analyse over de situatie die zeer de moeite waard is om te lezen: (Engels) http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1254861904634&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull .
Duidelijk is dat Israel nu in de situatie lijkt terecht gekomen die door Ehoed Barak werd voorspeld in een BBC documentaire met de titel: Will Israel bomb Iran?
"Uiteindelijk staat Israel alleen", was de voorspelling van Barak.
De gesprekken tussen en Iran en het Westen zullen maximaal een regeling opleveren over externe uraniumverrijking. Het voorstel is dat Iran de uraniumverrijking uitbesteed aan Rusland.
Voor Obama zal dit wellicht een acceptabele uitweg zijn, de Amerikaanse president zal de Nobelprijs als een molensteen om zijn nek hebben hangen vanaf nu.
De militaire optie lijkt voor de VS een non-optie geworden, en sancties werden eerder aangewend tegen Iran (o.a tijdens de crisis rond de Amerikaanse ambassade in de jaren '70 en de Irak-Iran oorlog) en bleken een totale mislukking.
Controle van het Iraanse nucleaire programma is slechts mogelijk op het openbare deel van dit programma, de ontdekking van een nieuwe verrijkingsfabriek in Qum maakte onlangs opnieuw duidelijk dat Iran een geheim programma heeft lopen.
Utibraak van Iran naar een nucleaire wapen is in een korte tijd te realiseren onder zo'n gecontroleerd programma, het zelfde werd door Noord Korea bewezen onlangs.
Dat verklaart waarschijnlijk de stilte in Israel, de voorspelling van Barak en andere Israelische politici en militaire deskundigen lijkt uitgekomen te zijn.
Het Westen kan misschien leven met een Iran dat officieel haar civiele nucleaire programma behoudt, maar Israel zal dat niet kunnen.
Het gehele machtsevenwicht in het altijd explosieve Midden Oosten zal erdoor veranderen en nucleaire chantage zal het nieuwe wapen worden in de strijd tegen Israel.
Dat maakt de vraag in de titel van de BBC documentaire "Will Israel bomb Iran?" actueler dan ooit.
Kijkt u naar deze BBC documentaire uit 2007 op Live Leak in zes delen : http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=802_1190433098
|
|
|
Iran, het Westen, Israel en het uur van de waarhei
|
Deel 1
| Deel 2
| Deel 3
Iran, het Westen, Israel en het uur van de waarheid.
De gesprekken tussen zes vooraanstaande naties en Iran leverden onlangs het vertekende beeld op dat er wellicht toch een diplomatieke oplossing voor het Iraanse nucleaire programma gevonden zou kunnen worden.
Het voorstel voor verrijking van het Iraanse uranium in een derde land (Rusland) werd in het Westen als een positieve stap gezien.
In Iran hadden woordvoerders het echter over de aankoop van opgewerkt uranium voor een proefreactor in Teheran en waren als vanouds negatief over de intenties van het Westen.
Ook in Israel was men in het geheel niet onder de indruk.
De media reageerden daar met scepsis en wezen op de oude Iraanse truc om met dit soort deel onderhandelingen tijd te winnen. De Israëlische regering zweeg echter in alle talen, en dat was opmerkelijk gezien de intensieve campagne om het Iraanse probleem internationaal onder de aandacht te brengen.
Uur van de waarheid
Het uur van de waarheid lijkt voor de Iraanse nucleaire crisis aangebroken.
Over dat moment sprak Ehoed Brak drie jaar geleden in een BBC documentaire “Will Israel bomb Iran?”.
Hij voorspelde toen dat Israel uiteindelijk alleen zou komen te staan in de confrontatie met Iran.
Het aanbod om Iraans uranium te verrijken in een derde land duidt op een internationale acceptatie van een nucleair Iran binnen de beperkingen van het non proliferatie verdrag.
Het probleem is dat deze acceptatie gebaseerd lijkt op wishful thinking over de Iraanse intenties en op beoordelingsfouten die de EU en VS al dertig jaar ook maken ten opzichte van Iran.
Iraanse aspiraties
De Iraanse houding ten opzichte van kernwapens veranderde tegen het eind van het tijdperk Khomeiny. De Ayatollah was tegen kernwapens op basis van zijn interpretatie van Islam.
Op een geheime bijeenkomst van de Iraanse organisatie voor Atoom Energie in 1987 zei de huidige leider van Iran ayatollah Khamenei echter het volgende: “ Onze natie is altijd onderwerp geweest van externe bedreigingen. Het weinige dat wij kunnen doen tegen deze gevaren is onze vijanden bewust maken van het feit dat wij ons kunnen verdedigen. Hieruit volgt dat iedere stap die we hier nemen de defensie en de revolutie moet dienen. Met het oog op dit doel moeten we snel en hard aan het werk”.
Kort daarop legde Iran contact met het Pakistaanse Khan netwerk over de aankoop van kennis en materieel voor een nucleair wapenprogramma.
Niet alleen de ontwikkelingen rond de nu bekende nucleaire faciliteiten duiden op Iraanse aspiraties om uit te groeien tot een regionale supermacht met mondiale aspiraties. Uitspraken van Iraanse leiders over het einde van het tijdperk van Westerse dominantie en een ongekende wapenwedloop waarbij Iran nu zelf onderzeeërs, fregatten, tanks, en gevechtsvliegtuigen produceert bewijzen welke richting Iran voor ogen staat. Daarnaast heeft Iran nu de Sejjil intercontinentale twee trapsraket uitgetest en heeft het een programma voor spionage satellieten.
De Iraanse woordvoerder voor buitenlandse zaken Hassan Qashqavi zei deze week het volgende:
“ de wereld heeft geaccepteerd dat Iran een van de vijf strategische machten is, het resultaat daarvan is dat Iran een rol heeft in het management van de wereld”.
Westerse beoordelingsfouten
Westerse- en in het bijzonder Amerikaanse beoordelingsfouten ten opzichte van Iran verdienen een nadere bestudering. De overeenkomsten in de wijze waarop de VS reageerde op ontwikkelingen in Iran ten tijde van de Iraanse revolutie en de reactie op de ontdekking van het nucleaire programma door de VS in 1993 zijn opvallend.
In 1979 had de VS vijf inlichtingen diensten operabel in Iran, de ambassade in Teheran had een 1000 koppige staf en de CIA directeur ter plaatse voerde iedere week overleg met de Shah.
Het oververtegenwoordigde inlichtingen apparaat van de VS bleek echter volslagen blind voor de zich ontwikkelende revolutie.
De pas gekozen Amerikaanse president Carter wilde breken met het beleid van zijn voorganger Nixon en presenteerde zich als “mister clean”. Zijn eerste grote inschattingsfout was een verklaring in Teheran op Nieuwjaar 1978 dat “Iran een eiland van stabiliteit in een van de meest roerige delen van de wereld was”.
De Amerikanen bleven ook daarna blind voor de ontwikkelingen in Iran en doof voor waarschuwingen van de Mossad dat het einde van het Shah tijdperk nabij was.
Ook nadat Carter uiteindelijk ontwaakte bleef hij de situatie verkeerd in schatten.
Zo probeerde hij, na de val van de Shah, Khomeiny over te halen om een pro-VS overgangsregering te accepteren.
Hieruit bleek dat hij noch Khomeiny noch de revolutie begreep, die immers mede tegen de VS invloed in Iran gericht was.
De volgende inschattingsfout van Carter was het gebruiken van de Iraakse aanval op Iran in september 1980 om de gijzelaars in de Amerikaanse ambassade vrij te krijgen. Carter wilde het wapen embargo op Iran gebruiken om een deal over de gijzelaars met Iran te sluiten.
Maar de calculatie dat Iran een paar weken in de oorlog met Irak, gedwongen zou zijn om bij de VS aan te kloppen voor onderdelen en munitie voor de Amerikaanse wapens bleek fout. Khomeiny omzeilde het embargo zoals hij dat eerder ook had gedaan. Iran kocht alles wat het nodig had in Vietnam, dat geen gebrek had aan Amerikaans materieel.
Uiteindelijk bleken deze beoordelingsfouten fataal voor Carter en verloor hij het presidentschap aan Reagan.
Catastrofale fouten
Ook in het lange traject naar de huidige situatie lijken dergelijke beoordelingsfouten een catastrofale rol te spelen.
Zo liep in 1993 Masoud Naraghi, die voor de Iraanse regering onderhandelingen had gevoerd met Abdoel Qadeer Khan- het hoofd van het Pakistaanse kernwapenprogramma -over naar de Amerikanen.
Naraghi bevestigde informatie die de CIA van de Duitse inlichtingen dienst had gekregen.
Iran had al sinds 1987 contacten met Khan over de aankoop van nucleaire uitrusting waaronder de blauwdrukken van de Urenco P1 centrifuge, die in Nederland door Khan gestolen waren.
In 1998 bevestigde de Pakistaanse overloper Khan Chaudry de contacten tussen Khan en Iran en getuigde tegenover de FBI over de Iraanse interesse in de productie van een nucleair wapen.
Ook vertelde hij de FBI over de instructie van Iraanse wetenschappers betreffende methodes om uranium te produceren dat geschikt is voor het maken van een nucleaire bom.
De CIA en aanvankelijk ook de Mossad leken zich
echter uitsluitend te concentreren op de Russische hulp bij het Iraanse programma in Busher .
Het duurde vervolgens tot 2003 voordat de VS naar buiten kwamen met hun gedetailleerde kennis over het Iraanse programma. Dit gebeurde nadat een Mossad agent had ontdekt dat Iran in Natanz een uraniumverrijkingsfabriek had gebouwd.
Kat en muis met IAEA
Na deze ontdekking ontstond het kat en muis spel met de IAEA. Iran gaf een minimum aan informatie of verzweeg elementen van haar programma totdat bewezen werd -door derden- dat deze elementen bestonden. Wanneer de IAEA inspecteurs belastend materiaal vonden zoals in april 2004, toen men sporen van wapengeschikt uranium vond in centrifuges, verklaarde Iran dat dit materiaal door de vorige eigenaar van de centrifuges was geproduceerd (Pakistan).
Een laptop met blauwdrukken voor een nucleaire bom afkomstig van een Iraanse nucleaire expert, die de Duitse geheime dienst aanleverde, bevatte volgens Iran gedateerde informatie die van het internet was gedownload.
Een inspectie van de militaire basis Lavizan, waar- volgens informatie die het IAEA kreeg- werd gewerkt aan raketten voor het vervoer van kernkoppen, werd weken opgehouden.
In die wachtperiode registreerde de Israëlische en Amerikaanse inlichtingen diensten dat Iran op grote schaal gebouwen sloopte in Lavizan. Het sloopafval werd afgevoerd naar plaatsen die ver weg lagen van de basis.
De meest recente ontdekking van Iraans bedrog betreft een nieuwe uraniumverrijkingsfabriek in Qom. Ook nu wist Iran inspectie met enige weken uit te stellen tot eind oktober.
De ontdekking van het Qom complex zette opnieuw grote vraagtekens bij de Amerikaanse inschattingen over het Iraanse programma
Het NIE rapport uit 2007, verklaarde dat Iran in 2003 haar nucleair wapenprogramma had geannuleerd. Een conclusie die werd getrokken ondanks de CIA wetenschap van de uraniumfabriek in Qom sinds 2006! Deze wetenschap had men eveneens deels aan de Mossad te danken.
Deze week werd bekend dat de Amerikanen overwegen de National Intelligence Estimate te herschrijven “op basis van nieuw verkregen inzichten”.
Beslissende fase
Volgens Israëlische bronnen is er nu minder dan een half jaar over om Iran effectief van een kernwapen af te houden.
De pogingen van de VS om alsnog een sanctieregime in te stellen om Iran te stoppen, lijken daarom op de pogingen van Carter om de Shah in het zadel te houden.
Iran is niet te stoppen via sancties omdat men uitgebreide ervaring heeft in het ontduiken van sancties. Maar bovenal zijn de Iraanse leiders ervan overtuigd dat de beslissende fase in de revolutie is aangebroken. De ideologie zal sterker zijn dan de problemen veroorzaakt door een embargo.
In Jeruzalem weet men als geen ander wat de ideologie achter die revolutie is en hoe sinds 1979 aan die revolutie vorm werd vormgegeven. Bovendien zijn de doelen ten opzichte van Israel altijd in duidelijke taal door Iran verwoord.
De “radiostilte” in Jeruzalem sinds de gesprekken in Geneve zou daarom kunnen betekenen dat het uur U is aangebroken en dat de beslissing over Israëlische actie tegen Iran aanstaande is.
Te hopen valt dat de het Westen het zwijgen van Israel en de geluiden uit Iran niet opnieuw verkeerd beoordeeld.
Na dertig jaar fouten en misplaatst pragmatisme wordt het hoog tijd dat het Westen dezelfde vastberadenheid als Iran toont en alsnog in actie komt.
Op het spel staat niet slechts het voortbestaan van Israel, maar ook de toekomst van het Iraanse volk en de vrije wereld als geheel.
IF
Klik hier om terug tegaan
|
IF over de Islamitische revolutie in Iran.
|
Part 1
| Part 2
The rise of Shia Islam in Iran and the role of the Ulema in ruling Iran
Part I
Islam, and particulary Twelver Shiism, is an integral part of Iran’s culture and society. Shiism became the official religion of Iran in 1501 after the establishment of the Safavid Empire, and already during that period Shi’a Mollahs were given a lot of political power in return for the provision of ideological support for the Safavid rulers, this caused their status and influence to grow. Throughout the rule of the Qajar dynasty the mullahs became even more powerful and they started to be involved in Iranian politics in a very fundamental way. Read part 2
At the beginning of Qajar rule it was decided that practitioners of interpretative reasoning, mujtahids, were necessary to interpret the foundations of Islam, and that every Muslim should chose a mujtahid as a source of imitation; marja-e taqlid. This gave the Shiite Ulema much more power and influence than their Sunni counterparts, and thus the Iranian Ulema (Islamic clergy) gained their basis for involvement in politics and their great amount of independence, which remained valid throughout Iran’s subsequent history.
Because of the weakness of the Qajar government and the growing European influence, the Iranian religious authorities were able to portray themselves as the defenders of Iran’s independence and nationalism. By the end of the 19th century the mullahs started to cooperate with the merchants, the bazaaris, in order to fight European influence and the Westernization of Iran. The outcome of this cooperation was the establishment of the Tobacco Movement, which fought against the granting of a monopoly of Iranian tobacco to Major Talbot, a British trader. The Iranian merchants felt that Iran was being sold to foreigners and that their businesses were being damaged, they started to protest and in their protest they looked for assistance from the Ulema (Islamic clergy), this marked the strengthening of the alliance between the merchants and the Ulema that became mostly visible during the Constitutional or Mashruteh Revolution of 1905 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Throughout the Muslim world the Ulema have had and still have a deep impact on the societies in which they live, often even more than their respective governments. Whereas the governments most of the time have to force their populations to accept changes, the Ulema can bring about political, social or economic change through their religious authority and their ability to mobilize the masses. Islam is a religion that encompasses all parts of society; politics as well as education and social life, private as well as communal life and therefore the presence of the religious establishment is felt very strongly, especially in countries that are governed according to the Shari’a, like Iran. The power of the Ulema stems from Islam itself, as they devote their time to an intensive study of the Quran and Sunna and they are regarded as the specialists on religious topics. Because of their broad knowledge of the religion and its laws they busy themselves with education, religious and moral guidance of their congregations and activism, in return the masses ask for their advice on every subject, while they also trust them and consider them the protectors of Islam, thereby giving them often more legitimacy than their governments.
The Ulema in Iran is well known for its ability to mobilize the masses against the Iranian rulers, various elements in Shia itself exist which make it easier for the Iran’s clergy to gain such a mass following. For example the centralization of victimhood by the Shiites, this notion has been prevailing in Shia throughout its history; meaning that the rest of the Muslim world throughout the centuries has oppressed the Shiites. This concept of victimization has been exploited by the religious authorities, which used it to reach out to as many people as possible, knowing that the believers could identify themselves with it. Another element in Shiism, which is connected to the notion of victimization, is the emphasis on martyrdom and resistance against oppression and tyranny, for example the ashura rituals have become very powerful for the political mobilization of the believers for whom Imam Husein is the symbol of resistance to oppression. This also made it easier for the religious authorities to mobilize the masses against the regime and it thus formed the ideological basis for the revolutions that took place in 20th century Iran.
Both Iranian revolutions were the results of long periods of dissatisfaction with and increasing opposition against the Iranian regimes by the masses, and the failure of the ruling bloc to cope with the frustration of their respective population. The revolutions required organization, good leadership and ideology in order to succeed. In both cases they had a lot of success, mainly due to the involvement of the religious establishment and their influence on the Iranian population. After the victory of the Tobacco Movement at the end of the 19th century, the way was opened for the Mashruteh Revolution, which started in 1905. This revolution came as a reaction to political dictatorship, growing European influence and involvement in Iranian matters, and in addition to that a lack of security of life and economic hardships that had been plaguing the population. This time, just like during the period of the Tobacco Movement, the Ulema had taken the lead to popular protest and they showed that they had enough political power to overthrow the government. The trigger that started the Constitutional Revolution was the public flogging of two merchants on the false accusation of speculation on sugar trade; this event caused the immediate closure of the Bazaar and cooperation between the Ulema and the merchants followed. Together they demanded, among other things, the enforcement of the Shari’a and the establishment of a house of Justice, the latter was later changed into the demand for a National Assembly. After the leaders of the revolution had managed to organize a general strike in Tehran the Shah had nothing left to do but to capitulate and in August 1906 he declared that an Assembly of Delegates was to be elected by the princes, Ulema, the Royal family, the elite, landowners, merchants and the guilds. The Ulema came to dominate this Majlis and they were largely responsible for the making of the first Iranian Constitution, which was ratified in October 1907. The following period was characterized by a struggle between the new Shah on the one hand and the Majlis and constitutionalist movement on the other, the Majlis was dissolved and the constitutionalists were persecuted, this eventually led to a civil war that ended in 1909 and symbolized the collapse of the royalist-counter revolution. However, the Constitutionalist Revolution was only ended by November 1911 when also the second Majlis was dismissed. During this period, which lasted from 1905-1911, the Ulema were actively involved in politics. They were moved by the expansion of their socio-political power at the expense of the secular government as well as by financial gains, but their power was significantly reduced during Reza Shah’s period of rule, which saw the secularization of the Iranian state and with it the ending of the judicial and educational tasks of the mullahs.
Only after his abdication in 1941 did they once again become a powerful political body and their first well-organized action against the government came in 1962, when they fiercely opposed the granting of voting rights to women. Their opposition caused the Muhammad Reza Shah, who had succeeded his father in 1941, to withdraw his proposal, but a year later he felt strong enough to end his alliance with the religious authorities and continued with his reform plans. This resulted in a six-point reform program known as “The White Revolution” and it marked the end of the alliance between the Shah and the Ulema that had been in existence since 1941. Throughout 1963 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led the Ulema in their opposition to the new reforms; he started to deliver angry sermons against the White Revolution and he attacked the Shah for damaging the laws of Islam and the first Iranian Constitution. One of Khomeini’s speeches implicated that the Shah wanted to destroy Islam and weaken the position of the Ulema who were defending the position of Islam, after this speech he was imprisoned and his arrest was followed by mass demonstrations throughout the country which were attended by religious as well as secular people. Muhammad Reza Shah tried to suppress the upheavals by using a lot of force, but this only had the opposite effect and after Khomeini was released from jail he became even fiercer in his opposition against the government, enjoying the broad support of all segments of society, this support became even stronger by the Shah’s decision to send Khomeini into exile in 1964. During the 1960’s Khomeini had held the opinion that the Ulema should only advice the government on the following of Islamic principles in passing laws, but by the 1970’s he had changed his views and called for the establishment of a theocracy (Mashru’eh). In his book Vilayat al-Faqih he argued that Islam was against the monarchy and he recommended that only jurisprudence should establish an Islamic state that was based on Islamic law, at first his ideas did not get a lot of positive responses but this changed with the mysterious death of his son, Mostafa. The memorial services that followed his death throughout the country frightened the Shah and he tried to put an end to them by force; this resulted in the deaths of several of Khomeini’s supporters.
The mullahs eventually became de facto leaders of the opposition movement because of the issuing of a fatwa by Ayatollah Shariatmadary in which he claimed that the Shah’s regime was un-Islamic, condemned the death of Khomeini’s supporters and called for the active participation of the public in the memorial services. He also decided that the remembrance of those slain would be a religious duty and by doing so he turned the opposition movement into a religious one and this gave more power to the Ulema. After 1978 the religious movement grew so fast that other political parties could not keep up with it and it became clear to them that the only party that could have an overall impact on the whole population was the Ulema. Once again an alliance was formed between the religious authorities and the other opposition movements, and once again it was led by the Ulema. Besides the fact that the Ulema were perceived as the defenders of Islam, their immense popularity also stemmed from the fact that they had always been taking care of the poor population, this gave them a lot of legitimation from the people, and the poor became the backbone of the Islamic Revolution. Another element that caused the popularity of the Ulema was the absence of nationwide political movements who could challenge the power of the religious authorities, and because of a lack of such a movement also the non-religious supported the Ulema in their struggle against the Shah and ultimately caused his downfall and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Part II
1-Ashura: The tenth day of the month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar and a month of mourning during which the Battle of Karbala is commemorated. During this battle Hussein ibn Ali, the son of Muhammad’s cousin was murdered by the army of the Ummayad Caliph Yazid at Karbala in 683 CE. According to the Shiites Muhammad had already decided that his cousin and son in law, Ali, would be his successor, in opposition to the Sunnis who believe that Muhammad’s ruler had to be elected by the Islamic community. The Shiites also believe that the political and religious leadership (Imamate) is the right of the male heirs of Ali, but this Imamate ends with the Twelfth Imam Mahdi who disappeared, Hussein was the third Imam and his martyrdom is one of the most emotional aspects of the Shi’a. During the processions that take place on Ashura the events of Karbala are immortalized by rituals such as beating on the bare chest and beating with chains on one’s back, performance of plays and narrating the story of Karbala. It is believed by the Shiites that mouring and crying for Hussein and his family will cause the salvation of the faithful; Hussein is also seen as the symbol of the struggle against tyranny and his martyrdom is used in order to stress the importance of sacrifice for the sake of freedom and the establishment of justice in society.
2 – The Iranian Tobacco Concession to Major Talbot: In 1890 the Qajar Government granted the monopolization of Iranian tobacco to a British trader, Major Talbot. The monopolization of the production, sale and export of tobacco was granted only to Major Talbot for the period of fifty years. The Iranian merchants started to protest against this concession because it put them at the mercy of a foreign company and they felt that the Iranian state was becoming increasingly dependent upon foreign powers and they saw this concession as an example of the total sell-out of Iran to foreigners. This event led to the establishment of the Tobacco Movement, which was cooperation between the merchants and the Ulema and in the end paved the way for the Mashruteh, or Constitutional Revolution, which started in 1905.
3 – The Story of the Daughters of Quchan: Was an event that showed the unfairness and corruptness of the Qajar Regime at the beginning of the 19th century, eventually the anger and disappointment that this affair triggered among the population led to the Constitutional Revolution. In 1905 the governor of the Quchan region in Northeast Iran had ordered the whole population to pay taxes, the poor inhabitants were unable to pay this tax and therefore they were forced to sell their daughters in order to raise enough money so they could pay their taxes after all. This incident happened a year before the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution and infuriated the Iranian population, the constant re-telling of this story became a focal point for anger and hatred towards the regime and it contributed to mobilize popular support against the Iranian rulers, eventually leading to the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution. In the end several of the persons that were responsible for this event were tried by the new parliament that had been established in 1906, after the families of the captive women had insisted on their punishment.
4- The White Revolution: During the early 1960´s Muhammad Reza Shah faced a difficult period that was characterized by economic problems, challenges from the opposition and American unwillingness to give him financial support. These unfavorable circumstances weakened him and it took some years before he felt stronger and was able to strike back at his opponents, secure American support and reorganize the state in order to restore dictatorship. By the end of 1973 he started to arrest members of the opposition on no charges and a short while later he proclaimed that he had implemented a six-point reform program called the “White Revolution”, later it was known by the name “Revolution of the Shah and the People” and the Shah added some more points, raising the number to 19 points. The original reforms included 1) land reform, 2) privatization of state owned factories to finance land reform, 3) voting rights for women, 4) profit-sharing for laborers, 5) the establishment of a literary public body, and 6) nationalization of the forests. In order to legitimize his reform program he submitted the six-points to a referendum; it was boycotted by the Ulema and the opposition and in spite of that the government declared that it was approved by 99% of the voters. The White Revolution wanted to make Iran in a completely capitalist state; the land reform destroyed the power of the landlords and the ultimate result of the Revolution was the change of the rich peasants into a countryside bourgeoisie and landlords became the capitalist class of the cities.
5 – The Doctrine of Vilayat-e Faqih: This was a doctrine that was established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1970; in this doctrine he set forth his idea of everyday involvement of the Ulema in the government of the state. At first he proclaimed his ideas in a series of lectures which attacked the principle of monarchy; these lectures were later published in book form under the name Hukumat-e Islam: Vilayat-e Faqih, (Islamic Government: Rule of the Religious Jurist). Khomeini claimed that the Ulema should not only busy themselves with the granting of religious guidance to the people and inertly wait for the Hidden Imam to reappear, but he urged them to actively take part in politics. He argued that the religious authorities had to become involved in politics in order to stop corrupt officials and oppressive and un-Islamic regimes, like that of the Shah. In addition to that he also called upon the religious students in various cities throughout Iran to activate and stimulate the masses in support of the Ulema and the establishment of a state that was based upon Islamic principles and law. At first his doctrine met with a lot of opposition, not everyone accepted the idea of Iran becoming an Islamic state, but the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party decided that Khomeini’s doctrine would be implemented at a later period when there would be less resistance to it and more stability in the country.
|
De geheime oorlog Iran tegen het Westen en Israel
|
De geheime oorlog van Iran vs Israel 1
| De geheime oorlog van Iran vs Israel 1
Ronen Bergman schreef een belangrijk boek over de geheime oorlog die Iran voerde en voert over de laatste dertig jaar tegen het Westen en tegen Israel. (The secret war with Iran). Hij geldt als een expert op het gebied van het Iraanse regime en schrijft voor de Israelische krant Yediot Acharonot..........
Lees verder bij De geheime oorlog Iran vs Israel 2
Wij tonen hier twee video's waarin hij uitleg geeft over deze geheime oorlog, die zich grotendeels verborgen voor het grote publiek voltrekt. De oorlog heeft echter grote gevolgen gehad voor de situtie in het Midden Oosten en kan grote gevolgen hebben voor de wereld in zijn geheel indien Iran er in slaagt kernwapens te ontwikkelen.
De eerste video bevat een lezing van Bergman en de tweede video bevat een interview dat in segmenten is te zien. (Spreektaal :Engels)
http://www.blinkx.com/video/the-secret-war-with-iran/ktxGW-XeibuFeXShUz8j8g
http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=JINSIDER&view=videos&query=Ronen+Bergman
|
Iraanse nucleaire dreiging?
|
Iraanse nucleaire dreiging: Israelische paranoia of mondiaal conflikt in wording ?
...................en wat was de Nederlandse rol in het Iraanse nucleaire programma !!, lees het artikel
|
|
|
Nucleaire aspiraties Iran
|
srael 1-7-2008 Yochanan Visser
Om de Israelische obsessie met de nucleaire aspiraties van Iran te begrijpen is het belangrijk verder te kijken dan alleen het Iraanse nucleaire programma en de uitspraken van Achmadinejad over het van de kaart vegen van Israel.
Daarom eerst een kleine introductie, in 1979 vond in de wereld een gebeurtenis plaats die verregaande konsekwenties zou hebben, de Iraanse islamitische revolutie, ik herinner me nog goed hoe ook de nederlandse media deze revolutie als een positieve wending neerzetten, in de trant van de bad guys tegen de good guys waarbij ayatollah Khomeiny de "good guy" was,vermoedelijk besefte toen niemand dat de revolutie die Khomeiny leidde een mondiaal doel had, in het westen werd het in ieder geval benaderd als een interne Iraanse kwestie.
Nu bijna 30 jaar later is het duidelijk wat de Iraanse islamitische revolutie werkelijk inhield, de Iraanse president doet er ook niet langer geheimzinnig over ,het doel is een Islamitische wereldrevolutie.
Om dit doel te bereiken streeft Iran er naar een zogenaamde "superpower" te worden, op termijn in plaats van de USA., dankzij haar enorme rijkdom aan olie en gas is Iran in staat om deze aspiraties te verwezelijken en heeft een immens wapenprogramma lopen ,waarbij het op dit moment al over lange afstand ballistische raketten beschikt, chemische wapens, eigen ontwerp gevechtsvliegtuigen en ........een nucleair programma.
LEES HIER VERDER
|
|
|
Rapport Israelische interceptie Iraans wapenschip.
|
Rapport over Israelische interceptie van Iraans wapenschip.
ITIC publiceerde een rapport over de recente interceptie van een Iraans wapenschip door Israel. Nu het doorzoeken van het schip is afgerond blijkt dit de grootste wapenvondst ooit te zijn sinds het begin van de Iraanse revolutie in 1979. De hoeveelheid wapens die gevonden is, was voldoende om Hizbollah opnieuw een oorlog van een maand tegen Israel te laten voeren.
Deze wapeninterceptie was niet de enige de laatste maand, ook Yemen bracht een Iraans schip op op 26 oktober jl.. Dit schip voer illegaal de kustwateren van Yemen binnen en bleek geladen met anti-tank raketten en andere wapens bestemd voor Shijitische strijders van de Houthi beweging die het bewind in Yemen bestrijden.
Het tekent de Iraanse aspiraties om een regionale supermacht te worden en het streven naar dominantie in het Midden Oosten en daarna de rest van de wereld.
Download hier het gehele rapport. FrancopITIC.pdf
|
Hizbola bewapent zich,VN kijkt andere kant op.
|
Deze film werd op Mabat (Israelische Journaal) uitgezonden. Hij werd zondagavond in Tsor(Tyrus) in Lebanon gemaakt door een mazlat (Onbemand vliegtuig) van de IDF.
Na de melding van een grote explosie in het huis van een Hizbollah baas werd het vliegtuig boven het huis gemanoevreerd en werd geregistreerd hoe Hizbollah raketten en ander wapentuig uit het huis haalde en op vrachtwagens afvoerde naar een andere locatie.
Pas nadat Hizbollah die operatie had afgerond kwam Unifil een kijkje nemen.
Volgens Israelische bronnen heeft Hizbollah inmiddels 40.000 raketten in Lebanon Beneden de Litani rivier heeft men nu 300 wapendepots (hetgeen verboden is volgens VN resolutie 1701).
Kijk hier voor de video:
|
Printerversie
|
|
Iran vs Israel
